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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE SCOPE OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE IN

INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE-Japan Line, Ltd. v; County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).

The County of Los Angeles levied a nondiscriminatory ad valorem tax'
on shipping containers 2 used exclusively in international commerce and
located temporarily within the state. 3 These containers, owned by six Japanese shipping companies, 4 were based and registered in Japan where
they were taxed upon their full value. 5 The County assessed a tax, apportioned on the basis of how long the containers were actually located in
California. 6 In contrast, Japan does nottax similar American-owned con7
tainers entering Japan in foreign commerce.
I. An ad valorem property tax is a tax levied as a percentage of assessed property value. The tax
was imposed upon domestic and foreign property alike. The Court noted: "there is no evidence that
California has treated Japanese containers differently from domestic containers for purposes of applying its property tax." Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 440-41 nn. 3 & 4
(1979).
2. The Court in JapanLine quoted Simon's definition of containers.
A container is a permanent reusable article of transport equipment . . . durably made of metal,
and equipped with doors for easy access to the goods and for repeated use. It is designed to
facilitate the handling, loading, stowage aboard ship, carriage, discharge from ship, movement,
and transfer of large numbers of packages simultaneously by mechanical means to minimize the
cost and risks of manually processing each package. SIMON, THE LAW OF SHIPPING CONTAINERS,
5 J. Maritime L. & Com. 507, 513 (1974).
JapanLine, 441 U.S. at 436 n. 1.
3. On appeal, the parties stipulated: "Each container is in constant transit save for time spent
undergoing repair or awaiting loading and unloading of cargo . . . Although none of appellants'
containers stays permanently in California, some are there at any given time; a container's average
stay in the State is less than three weeks." JapanLine, 441 U.S. at 436-37.
4. The Japanese companies were Japan Line, Ltd., Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd., Mitsui O.S.K.
Lines, Ltd., Nippon Yusen Kaisha, Showa Line, Ltd., and Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co.
5. The Japanese tax is described in the Guide to Japanese Taxes 1975-76, Kaikei ShoHo Sha,
Tokyo, Japan, 30, reprintedin, Appellants' Reply Brief at la-2a, Appendix A, Japan Line, 441 U.S.
434.
Fixed Asset Tax. Fixed assets tax is paid by the registered owner of land, buildings, ships or any
other kinds of depreciable assets as of January I of each year to a municipality (in exceptional
cases, to a municipality and to a prefecture). "Registered owner" means the person registered
as an owner of such property in a fixed assets tax ledger maintained by a municipality.
The annual tax rate is 1.4%. In some relatively poor municipalities the tax rate is higher than
1.4%, but it may not be higher than 2.1% in any case.
See also discussion of the tax in JapanLine, 441 U.S. at 452 n. 17.
6. The Court inJajanLine explained:
Property present in California on March 1 (the "lien date" under California law) of any year is
subject to ad valorem property tax. Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. §§ 117, 405, 2192 (West 1970
and Supp. 1979). A number of appellants' containers were physically present in appellees' jurisdictions on the lien dates in 1970, 1971, and 1972; this number was fairly representative of the
containers' "average presence" during each year.
JapanLine, 441 U.S. at 437.
7. Id.
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The Japanese companies paid the taxes under protest and successfully
sued for refund in the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles. 8 The
California court of appeal reversed the trial court's holding. 9 The California Supreme Court subsequently granted a hearing of the case and unanimously adopted the court of appeal's opinion. 10 On appeal, the United
States Supreme Court in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, I'
struck down the tax, as applied, holding that it violated the commerce
clause. In so doing, the Court created a new formula for evaluating the
constitutionality of state taxes levied on instrumentalities of foreign commerce. It added two tests to the standards previously applied to state taxes
on interstate commerce. 12
By exempting containers in international commerce from local ad valorem property taxes, the Japan Line Court's interpretation of the commerce clause gives foreign merchants an advantage over their domestic
competitors. The Court, lacking alternative grounds 13 for exempting foreign containers from the state tax, concluded that the commerce clause
justifies such disparate treatment. Rather than adopting an interpretation
of the commerce clause which is inconsistent with its purpose, the Court
should have upheld the tax and left the difficult question of international
tax policy to be resolved comprehensively in a more appropriate forum.
8. The superior court held that applying the property tax in derogation of the "home port doctrine" subjected international commerce to multiple taxation and thus was unconstitutional under the
commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. Id. at 438.
9. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 61 Cal. App. 3d 562, 132 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1976)10. 20 Cal. 3d 180, 141 Cal. Rptr. 905,571 P.2d254(1977).
11. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
12. 441 U.S. at 446-5 1. See notes 17, 33-41 and accompanying text infra. See also 7 HAs-rINGS
CONST. L.Q. 316 (1980).
13. The Court rejected the taxpayers' assertion that the tax contravened the Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation Between the United States and Japan (FCN), Apr. 2, 1953, [1953] 4
U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863 (providing that Japanese nationals residing in the United States may
not be subjected to payment of taxes "more burdensome than those borne by" United States nationals, and according Japan "most favored nation" status). Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 439 n.3. It deemed
"frivolous" the taxpayers' claim that the tax was prohibited by the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATI'), 61 Stat. A18 (providing that "imported products" may not be subjected to heavier
taxes, or to less favorable treatment, than like products of domestic origin). Id. at 439-40 n.4.
The court of appeal had rejected the taxpayers' arguments that the tax constituted an indirect
"Duty of Tonnage" proscribed by the U.S. CONs-r. art. I, § 10, cl. 3, and "Imposts or Duties"
proscribed by U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2, but the United States Supreme Court, in view of its
disposition, did not reach these arguments. Neither did it rule on the taxpayers' due process challenge. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 439-40 nn. 3 & 4.
The taxpayers asserted in brief that the tax was repugnant to the federal excise tax, the Customs
Convention on Containers and the implementing Customs Regulations, the Tariff Act of 1930, various aviation treaties and agreements, and the supremacy clause. They also argued that the tax constituted a prohibited "transit fee," did not satisfy the "presence" test, was not fairly related to services
rendered, was not fairly apportioned, and was discriminatory. Brief for Appellants at 28-49, Japan
Line, 441 U.S. at 440-41.

International Commerce
I. BACKGROUND
The commerce clause' 4 limits a state's power to tax. It provides that
"Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States ......
The commerce clause was a response to the chaotic economy which the
Articles of Confederation produced. Seaboard states exacted taxes for the
mere transit of goods, thereby increasing the cost to inland consumers.
Hostile state restrictions, retaliatory trade regulations, and protective tariffs combined to proliferate state disharmony and Balkanization of the
economy. 1 5 The commerce clause was designed to promote a national
economy by granting Congress the right to regulate commerce. The
clause serves as both a grant of federal power, and a restraint on state
action which would burden commerce. 16
The commerce clause has been interpreted to prohibit state taxes which
"unduly burden '17 interstate commerce, as, for example, by subjecting
it to multiple taxation. I8 Thus, the Supreme Court has declared that taxes
on interstate commerce must (1) have a substantial nexus with the state;
(2) be fairly apportioned; (3) not discriminate against interstate commerce; and (4) be fairly related to the services provided by the state. 19

14.

3.
U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl.

15.

THE FEDtaA~sT No. 22 (A. Hamilton). G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERI-

ALS 127 (9th ed. 1975 & Supp. 1979).
16. GUNTHER, supranote 15, at 127.
17. See Hellerstein, State Taxation Under the Commerce Clause:An HistoricalPerspective, 29
VANo. L. REv. 335, at 336, 344, 348 (1976). See generally J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, STATE
AND LOCAL TAXATiON: CASES AND MATERIALS (1978).

18. See, e.g., Evco v. Jones, 409 U.S. 91 (1972)(unapportioned state tax on activities in interstate commerce held to violate commerce clause because the receipts were subject to a potential
double tax burden via levies in other states to which intrastate commerce was immune); J.D. Adams
Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938)(unapportioned state income tax constituted a regulation of
and burden upon interstate commerce in violation of commerce clause because it created a risk of
multiple taxation). Cf. Central R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607 (1962)(dicta)(tax on full value
was not established elsewhere, the Court observing that only multiple taxation
upheld where tax situs
of interstate operations offends the commerce clause); Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue,
303 U.S. 250 (1938)(dicta)(in upholding the validity of the tax at issue, the Court noted that local
taxes, measured by gross receipts from interstate commerce, have often been declared unconstitutional when they subject interstate commerce to a double tax burden not imposed upon intrastate
commerce). But cf. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Blair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978)(Court upheld a state sales tax
formula against a commerce clause challenge where duplicate taxation was not proven and where
overlap would only arise in the event of mathematical imprecision in apportionment, which imprecision does not contravene the commerce clause).
19. This four element test for taxes upon interstate commerce was first set forth in Complete
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), and was recently affirmed in Department of Revenue v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734 (1978).
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Various states may impose taxes, based on the estimated actual "'presence" 20 of goods in their jurisdictions.
Foreign commerce presents even greater risks of multiple taxation than
commerce between the states. In interstate commerce, the risk of multiple
taxation is controlled by the availability of recourse to the United States
21
Supreme Court, which has the power to adjudicate between the states.
When more than one nation imposes taxes upon goods in international
commerce, however, there is no analogous mutually acknowledged sovereign to oversee apportionment. 22 Because apportionment is difficult in
the international context, the home port doctrine, 23 with its simple principle of a single taxation jurisdiction, appears attractive. Largely for this
reason, the same courts that have abandoned the home port rule in taxation of interstate commerce have been reluctant to discard it in taxation of
24
foreign, and particularly oceangoing commerce.
Despite its ease of application, the home port doctrine cannot assure
the absence of multiple taxation in international commerce. For example,
an American court's decision that California has exclusive taxing jurisdiction over a vessel with its port of origin in that state2 5 cannot prevent a
foreign power from levying its own tax upon the ship. 26 Moreover, be-

20. Brief for Appellees on Motion to Dismiss or Affirm at 9. See also Japan Line, 441 U.S. at
445.
21. JapanLine, 441 U.S. at 446-47.
22. The International Court of Justice could regulate apportionment, but only in the unlikely
event that rival taxing authorities would submit to its jurisdiction. Id. at 438,447.
23. The "home port doctrine" originated in Hays v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 58 U.S. (17 How.)
596 (1855). In Hays, California sought to impose property taxes on oceangoing vessels that had their
home port in New York and remained only briefly in California to unload and undergo repairs. Because the vessels were in California only temporarily, they were held to have no tax situs there. The
Court decided that the home port of New York was the only state with authority to tax the ships. In
Morgan v. Parham, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 471 (1872), the Court expanded the home port doctrine from
a rule of situs to a test for determining when commerce was "burdened." See Clark, ProperyTaration of Foreign Goods and Enterprises-A Study in Inconsistency, 4 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 39, 52
(1976); Comment, Limitations on State Taxation of Foreign Commerce: The Contemporary Vitality
of the Home-Port Doctrine, 127 U. PENN. L. REV. 817 (1979).
24. See, e.g., Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equalization. 347 U.S. 590 (1954)
(approving apportioned tax on domestic aircraft, but distinguishing vessels "used to plow the open
seas"); Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169, 173 (1949)(approving apportioned
tax on barges navigating inland waterways, but "not reach[ing] the question of taxability of ocean
carriage"); Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891)(approving apportioned
tax on interstate railroad rolling stock, but distinguishing oceangoing vessels). The Court in Japan
Line, 441 U.S. at 442, cited these three cases.
25. The home port is the port where the vessel is registered. Comment, Limitations on State
Taxation of Foreign Commerce: The Contemporary Vitality of the Home-Port Doctrine, 127 U.
PENN. L. REV. 817, 819 (1979).

26. In Hays v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596 (1855), the Court admitted that the
home port doctrine cannot prevent multiple taxation of interstate and foreign commerce.

International Commerce
cause the home port doctrine has no clear constitutional foundation,2 7
28 and even "abandoned. "29
some courts have labelled it "anachronistic"
With the traditional rule subject to such criticism, the proper standard for
evaluating state taxation of instrumentalities of foreign commerce was
unclear when JapanLine came before the Court.
II.

CONTENTIONS AND COURT'S REASONING

The parties raised two principal issues. The taxpayers first argued that
the containers should be subject to taxation only in their home port, Japan. 30 The County responded that the home port doctrine established
merely a rule that taxes can be assessed by the jurisdiction in which the
taxed property has situs. Such a rule, the County said, would not foreclose its taxation of containers which had actual situs in California. 3 1 The
Court questioned the vitality of the home port doctrine, but found no need
32
to reach that issue.
The taxpayers further insisted that the concept of tax apportionment,
which prevailed in interstate commerce, could not readily be translated
into the context of foreign commerce, because it was neither feasible in
practice nor consistent with international custom. 33 The County, on the
other hand, defended the tax on the grounds that it met the commerce
27. JapanLine, 441 U.S. at 443. The home port doctrine has no constitutional source. It is based
on common law jurisdiction to tax. See Note, State Taxation of Foreign Aircraft Used in Foreign
Commerce, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 968,969-71 (1961).

28. JapanLine, 441 U.S, at 443 (citing Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292,
320 (1944)(Stone, C.J., dissenting)). In Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. County of Alameda, 117 Cal.2d
448, 528 P.2d 56, 66 (1974), the court also described the home port doctrine as "anachronistic."
The Sea-Land court observed that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Northwest Airlines,
Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944), which permittted the "home port" to tax on full value
because tax situs had not been established elsewhere, "cannot be read as supporting the home port
doctrine." (Other citations omitted.) Sea-Land, 528 P.2d at 66 n. 14.
29. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. at 320 (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
30. Brief for Appellants at 22-27. Appellants argued that the Court in Ott v. Mississippi Valley
Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949), and in Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S.
18 (1891), had been "careful not to abrogate the validity of the 'Home Port' rule in the case of
instrumentalities used exclusively in foreign commerce." Brief for Appellants at 23. In fact, the
Court in both cases had distinguished "oceangoing" commerce. See note 24 supra.
31. Brief for Appellees on Motion to Dismiss orAffirmat 10-11,JapanLine, 441 U.S. 434.
32. JapanLine, 441 U.S. at443-44.
33. Brief for Appellants at 24-25, Japan Line, 441 U.S. 434. Specifically discussing international custom, appellants explained: "[i]t has been accepted by a multitude of foreign nations, which
likewise exempt foreign vessels, ships' gear, and other integral parts of the vessel from taxation in
their respective jurisdictions on the basis that other nations follow the same or similar concepts." Id.
Appellants cited Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 433 (1978), as demonstrating the
importance of this "reliance interest." In addition, the Japan Line court noted: "[i]f an instrumentality of commerce is domiciled abroad, the country of domicile may have the right, consistent with
the custom of nations, to impose a tax on its full value." JapanLine, 441 U.S. at 447.
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clause test which had thus far been applied to interstate and foreign commerce. 34 The County emphasized that a single standard for interstate and
foreign commerce would secure "equality" between domestic and foreign taxpayers and uniformity without impairing the federal government's ability to "fine tune" commercial relations with foreign governments. 35 Furthermore, the County argued that it was entitled to
compensation for services, such as fire and police protection, which were
extended to the stored containers.36
The Court invalidated the tax under the commerce clause, 37 declaring
that a tax on instrumentalities of international commerce 38 must meet not
only the four tests imposed in interstate commerce, 39 but two additional
requirements. First, a tax on foreign commerce may be struck down if it
raises a "substantial risk of international multiple taxation." 40 The Court
emphasized that the California tax created more than a risk of multiple
taxation; it created multiple taxation in fact. 4 1 Second, a tax must not prevent the federal government from "speaking with one voice" when regu-

34. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 445. Appellees cited two state supreme court opinions, Canadian
Pac. R.R. v. King County, 90 Wash. 38, 155 P.2d 416 (1916), and Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. County
of Alameda, 12 Cal. 3d 772, 117 Cal. Rptr. 448, 528 P.2d 56 (1974), to support this position.
Appellees' Motion to Dismiss or Affirm at 12. In CanadianPacific, the Washington court applied the
interstate commerce taxability tests of Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18
(1891), to foreign-owned railroad cars. In Sea-Land, the California court upheld an apportioned
property tax on cargo shipping containers used in both interstate and foreign commerce.
Appellees also relied upon Zee Toys, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 85 Cal. App. 3d 763, 149
Cal. Rptr. 750 (1978)(restored to the calendarfor reargument, 48 U.S.L.W. 3698). where the California court of appeal, citing Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax. Comm'r, 429 U.S. 318 (1977), as
authority, struck down as a violation of the commerce clause an ad valorem tax exemption which
discriminated against interstate commerce in favor of foreign commerce. Appellees' Supplemental
Brief at 1-3.
35. Appellees' Motion to Dismiss or Affirm at 12-13.
36. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 445, 456-57. Services for which the property tax was collected,
included "not only police and fire protection, but the benefits of a trained work force and the advantages of a civilized society." Id. at 445. See also Appellees' Motion to Dismiss or Affirm at 8 (noting, in addition, maintenance of roads).
37. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 445-54. The Court did not expressly discuss the supremacy clause,
though it declared the "desirability of uniform treatment of containers." Id. at 452.
38. The Court in Japan Line stressed that "[t]he question here is a . . . narrow one, that is,
whether instrumentalities of commerce that are owned, based, and registered abroad and that are used
exclusively in international commerce, may be subjected to apportioned ad valorem property taxation
by a State." Id. at 444.
39. Id. at 445-51. See note 19 and accompany text supra. The Court assumed, arguendo, that
the tax met the interstate commerce requirements. JapanLine, 441 U.S. at 45 1.
40. Id. at 451. The Court's formulation is phrased in terms of a substantial risk of multiple taxation; yet, the Court specifically limited its holding to cases where multiple taxation existed in fact. Id.
at 452 n. 17. Consequently, it is not clear what standards will apply to taxes presenting only a risk of
multiple taxation.
41. Id. at452.
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International Commerce
lating commercial relations with foreign governments. 42 The Court concluded that the tax raised such an obstacle, stating that federal uniformity
in this area was desirable. 43 Moreover, there was a risk of retaliation by
foreign taxing authorities, 44 and if other states decided to impose similar
taxes, instrumentalities of international commerce would be exposed to
45
varying degrees of multiple taxation.
The Court acknowledged the force of the County's arguments as to its
uncompensated services 46 and discrimination against domestic taxpayers, 47 but stated that such claims were directed to the "wrong forum.' 48
It rejected the County's argument that "any multiple taxation created by
California's tax can be cured by congressional action or by international
agreement."' 49 The Court viewed these proposed alternatives as, in effect, a concession by the County that a uniform federal rule was necessary; consequently, the Court declared that "California may not tell this
Nation or Japan how to run their foreign policies." 50
III.

COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS: MISINTERPRETATION

According to the Supreme Court's decision in Japan Line, the commerce clause demands a more stringent analysis when foreign, rather than
interstate commerce is at issue. The Court concluded that a tax on an
instrumentality of foreign commerce is unconstitutional, even when it is
apportioned and nondiscriminatory, if it "creates a substantial risk of international multiple taxation," 51 or if it "prevents the Federal Government from 'speaking with one voice.' "52 The description, however, is
based on a questionable constitutional analysis 53 which may have long
lasting and undesirable consequences.

42. Id. at 451.
43. See note 37 supra.
44. JapanLine, 441 U.S. at453.
45. Id.
46. See note 36 supra.
47. JapanLine, 441 U.S. at 457.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 454.
50. Id. at 455.
51. Id. at451.
52. Id. at 449 (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976)).
53. The United States Supreme Court has recently chosen not to extend its JapanLine analysis
into the context of apportioned state taxes on income from both domestic and foreign sources. Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 100 S. Ct. 1223 (1980).
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"SubstantialRisk ofInternationalMultiple Taxation"

The Supreme Court began its analysis with the observation: "[ilt is a
commonplace of constitutional jurisprudence that multiple taxation may
well be offensive to the Commerce Clause." 54 This statement is misleading as a general proposition and must be viewed in the context of the
cases from which it was derived. 55 The cited cases do not prohibit multiple taxation as a per se violation of the commerce clause; rather, they
prohibit a state from exacting more than its fair share. The cited cases
required that property taxes on instrumentalities of commerce be apportioned among jurisdictions having a nexus to the property; consequently,
neither the domicile state nor any other state may tax the full value of the
property.
The cases cited by the Court stand for the proposition that a state which
merely exacts an apportioned property tax does not violate the Constitution; rather, the domicile state which exacts more than its fair share places
an unconstitutional burden on commerce. These cases are not squarely on
point in an international commerce situation. If they were literally applied, they would lead the Court to conclude that Japan, the domicile jurisdiction that taxed the full value of the property, violated the commerce
clause, not California.
The Court did not acknowledge that it was extending a doctrine derived
in interstate commerce cases to an international commerce case. Instead,
the Court explained that its previous approval of apportionment was
based on its "ability to enforce full apportionment by all potential taxing
bodies." 56 The commerce clause was designed to prevent states from
placing unfair burdens on commerce. Any "unfair burden" in JapanLine
was not the result of discriminatory state action, but was merely the result
of Japan's decision to tax more than its fair share. The Court's inability to
make Japan conform to our constitutional standards is irrelevant. The
Court's duty is to ensure that states do not exact unfair taxes. 57 Nothing in
the history of the commerce clause suggests that a nondiscriminatory, apportioned, ad valorem property tax which is fairly related to state services
58
is the type of burden the Framers intended to eradicate.
54. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 446 (citations omitted).
55. Evco v. Jones, 409 U.S. 91, 94 (1972); Central R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607, 612
(1962); Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382, 384-385 (1952); Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge
Line Co., 336 U.S. 169, 174 (1949); J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 311 (1938), all

cited in JapanLine, 441 U.S. at 446.
56. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at447.
57. See notes 15-18 and accompanying text supra.
58. See notes 15-20 and accompanying text supra. In Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S.
at 288, the United States Supreme Court explained:
To be sure, allowance of nondiscriminatory ad valorem property taxation may increase the cost
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B.

"Speaking with one Voice"

Alternatively, the Court rejected the California tax because it prevented
the federal government from "speaking with one voice" in regulation of
foreign commerce. 59 The Court cited the Customs Convention on Containers 6° as evidence of the desirability of uniformly treating containers
moving in international commerce. It also pointed out that California's
' 61
tax would create "an asymmetry in international maritime taxation,"
which might invite retaliatory taxes. 62
It is unnecessary, however, to impose rigid federal uniformity in this
case. Significantly, the Convention on Containers does not prescribe any
rules for ad valorem property taxation. If its authors had intended to prescribe comprehensive federal regulations of container taxes, it seems
likely they would have done so. Merely because uniform treatment of

of goods purchased by 'inland' consumers. But as already noted, such taxation is the quid pro
quo for benefits actually conferred by the taxing State. There is no reason why local taxpayers
should subsidize the services used by the importer; ultimate consumers should pay for such
services as police and fire protection accorded goods just as much as they should pay transportation costs associated with those goods (footnotes omitted).
For further discussion of Michelin Tire, see notes 67-73 and accompanying text infra.
The California Supreme Court has discussed the focus of the commerce clause. In Sea-Land Serv.,
Inc. v. County of Alameda, 117 Cal.2d 448, 528 P.2d 56, 67 (1974), the California court upheld the
apportioned county tax on containers which were instrumentalities of both foreign and interstate commerce. In that opinion the court adopted the reasoning of Justice Traynor in his dissent in Scandinavian Airlines System, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 56 Cal.2d 11, 14 Cal. Rptr. 25, 363 P.2d 25
(1961). In Scandinavian Airlines, the court struck down an apportioned tax on airplanes flying international skies; the opinion, in effect, reaffirmed the home port doctrine. Sea-Land, 528 P.2d at 65. In
Sea-Land, the court concluded that "any threat of multiple burdens imposed by foreign taxing authorities is irrelevant to the crucial issue of whether any state is discriminating against interstate or
foreign commerce." Sea-Land, 528 P.2d at 67. It explained that merely because a state court lacks
jurisdiction to compel independent nations to adopt a uniform nondiscriminatory system of taxation,
"itdoes not follow that the states must forego the power to impose taxes that are not in themselves
discriminatory." Id. (quoting ScandinavianAirlines Sys., 363 P.2d at 45 (Traynor, J., dissenting)).
See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 20 Cal. 3d 180, 186, 141 Cal. Rptr. 905, 908, 571
P.2d 254, 257 (1977).
59. See note 52 supra.
60. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 452-53. The Court stated: "Under this Convention, containers
temporarily imported are admitted free of 'all duties and taxes whatsoever chargeable by reason of
importation.' 20 U.S.T. at 304. The Convention reflects a national policy to remove impediments to
the use of containers as 'instruments of international traffic.' 19 U.S.C. § 1322 (a)."
61. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at453.
62. The Court in JapanLine feared the "acute" risk of retaliatory taxes by Japan, which "of
necessity would be felt by the Nation as a whole." Id. The Court also pointed out that retaliation by
some nations could be automatic (e.g., West German law provides for a reciprocal response to taxes
on its instrumentalities of commerce). Id. n. 18. See Brief for Appellants, 19-20, Japan Line, 441
U.S. 434, noting that at least eight foreign governments have expressed concern to the State Department because the California tax was imposed.
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containers is desirable in some contexts 63 does not render it necessary or
even desirable in all contexts.
Neither should the risk of retaliatory taxes have dictated the Court's
interpretation of the commerce clause. International tax apportionment
could have been arranged by treaty. 64 It is dubious that the harm of retaliatory taxes 65 is any greater than that of denying a state its right to charge
for services rendered on an apportioned nondiscriminatory basis. And although different states might tax containers at different rates, 66 their taxes
could vary only in relation to the containers' actual presence in the taxing
67
jurisdiction and the character of the services rendered by the ports.
The Court adopted the phrase "speaking with one voice" from Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages 68 without embracing either its reasoning or conclusion. The underlying issue in Michelin Tire is identical to the issue in
Japan Line;69 the policies animating both the import-export clause and
the commerce clause are "much the same." 70 Yet, in Michelin the Court
concluded that such "nondiscriminatory property taxation can have no
impact whatsoever on the Federal Government's exclusive regulation of
foreign commerce, [because] . . . it cannot be applied selectively to encourage or discourage any importation in a manner inconsistent with federal regulation.' '71 By the same reasoning, an apportioned nondiscriminatory property tax does not interfere with the federal government's right
to regulate foreign commerce under the commerce clause. 72 The Court in
Michelin stressed that "only the clearest constitutional mandate should
63. For example, the Customs Convention on Containers, art. I(b), May 18, 1956, (1969] 20
U.S.T. 301, 304, T.I.A.S. No. 6634, grants containers" 'temporary admission free of import duties
and import taxes and free import prohibitions and restrictions,' provided they are used solely in foreign commerce and are subject to re-exportation. 20 U.S.T. at 304." See Japan Line, 441 U.S. at
446 n. 10.
64. See, e.g., Clark, PropertyTaxation of Foreign Goods & Enterprises-A Study in Inconsistency, 4 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 39, 59 (1976); Amicus Brief of the MultiState Tax Commission and
Participating States at 42, JapanLine, 441 U.S. 434.
65. The Court sought to avoid the levy of such taxes by foreign nations. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at
453.
66. See, e.g., JapanLine, 441 U.S. at 453.
67. This idea is illustrated by the implication in Michelin Tire, 423 U.S. 276, 287, that foreign
commerce should be taxed on a par with interstate commerce.
68. 423 U.S. 276(1976).
69. The underlying issue in both cases is whether a state may impose reasonable taxes to finance
services rendered, when all goods are assessed equally on the basis of actual presence.
70. 441 U.S. at 449 n.14. One of the principal purposes of the import-export clause, which
prohibits state imposts or duties on imports, is to vest in the federal government the exclusive power
to regulate foreign commerce. Michelin Tire, 423 U.S. at 285-86. The commerce clause similarly
secured for the federal government the exclusive power to regulate foreign commerce. See Japan
Line, 441 U.S. at 449-50 n. 14; Michelin Tire, 423 U.S. at 290 n. 11.
71. 423 U.S. at 286.
72. The federal government is free to preempt the field at any time.
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lead us to condemn such taxation." 73 The existence of such a constitutional mandate in JapanLine is far from clear.
C.

Implicationsof Japan Line

By making it unconstitutional for states to tax foreign instrumentalities
of commerce, the decision in JapanLine revives the expressly overruled
principle of Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor,74 that certain seg75
ments of commerce enjoy constitutional immunity from state taxation.
The JapanLine Court's interpretation of the commerce clause not only
harms the states' interests but places the United States at a disadvantage
in international commerce. If Japan or another nation begins taxing instrumentalities of foreign commerce, the states will be constitutionally
barred from responding with a like tax, and Congress, unlike other national governments, cannot levy a direct property tax. 76 Denying such
taxes to the states places the United States in an awkward situation if the
73. 423 U.S. at 293.
74. Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951), was expressly overruled in
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288-89 (1977). The Court in Complete Auto
Transit,430 U.S. at 287, quoting from Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100, 108 (1975),
stated:
[D]ecisions of this Court, particularly during recent decades, have sustained nondiscriminatory,
properly apportioned state corporate taxes upon foreign corporations doing an exclusively interstate business when the tax is related to a corporation's local activities and the State has provided
benefits and protections for those activities for which it is justified in asking a fair and reasonable
return.
In Colonial the Court sustained a Louisiana franchise tax that had been carefully reworded from a tax
on the privilege of "carrying on or doing business" in the State to one upon "the qualification to do
business in this State or the actual doing of business within this State in a corporate form." According
to the evidence before the Court in Complete Auto Transit, the tax was apportioned, nondiscriminatory, and sufficiently related to benefits provided by the State. This decision effectively stripped
Spector Motor of any force by distinguishing it only on the grounds that Spector Motor involved a tax
on the privilege of carrying on interstate commerce.
75. The rule of SpectorMotor had its origin in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946), in which
Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated that interstate commerce should enjoy a sort of "free trade" immunity
from state taxation. The Court in Spector relied upon this analysis to strike down a Connecticut "tax
or excise upon [a Missouri corporation's] franchise for the privilege of doing business Within the
State" measured by apportioned net income. The Spector rule was gradually whittled down until
expressly overruled in Complete Auto Transit, where the Court upheld the constitutionality of a tax
on the "privilege of doing business" in Mississippi. The Court, quoting from Colonial,stated:
It is a truism that the mere act of carrying on business in interstate commerce does not exempt a
corporation from state taxation. 'It was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those
engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden even though it increases
the cost of doing business.' Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254
(1938). ColonialPipelineCo. v. Traigle,421 U.S. at 108.
430 U.S. at 288.
76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 and art. I, § 9, cl. 4 require that "direct" taxes be apportioned
among the several states in accordance with their respective populations. J. FREELAND, S. LIND, R.
STmPHNS, FUNDAMENTA .sOF FEDERAL INCOME TAXArION: CASES AND MATERIALS 14 (2d ed. 1977).
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present system of international tax forebearance should change. The federal government's only alternatives would be either to levy a federal
excise tax or to attempt to negotiate a treaty precluding taxation of instrumentalities of foreign commerce. The United States' bargaining position
is weakened, however, if neither a state nor the federal government has
constitutional authority to assess ad valorem taxes.
Furthermore, the exemption of foreign commercial instrumentalities
from taxes otherwise imposed on goods in interstate commerce may itself
constitute impermissible discrimination. Although the United States Supreme Court has yet to consider favoring international over domestic
commerce, it has been quick to strike down any tax favoring local over
interstate commerce. 77 By analogy, it should condemn taxes which dis78
criminate against domestic commerce in favor of foreign commerce.
Many commentators agree that the federal system should require states to
accord "neutral" treatment to interstate and foreign commerce. 79 The
nondiscriminatory tax invalidated in JapanLine should have been upheld
on this basis.
The Court has voiced loud concern for "uniformity" without considering the best means to promote it.80 As recently as 1978, the Court conceded that Congress should decide such issues. Congressional authority
under the commerce clause would justify the enactment of legislation dictating uniform rules. Indeed, the Court admitted that "[i]t is to that body
77. See note 18 supra.
78. In Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977), the Court indicated
generally that taxes favoring one class of regulated commerce over another are prohibited. Relying
upon Boston Stock Exchange. the California court of appeal recently invalidated a tax that discriminated in favor of foreign commerce. Zee Toys, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles; Sears, Roebuck and
Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 85 Cal. App. 3d 763, 149 Cal. Rptr. 750 (1978)(striking down an ad
valorem tax levied upon tangible personal property in plaintiffs' possession, stored in warehouses in
Los Angeles County on the tax lien dates, because the tax was not imposed on foreign goods and the
tax afforded foreign goods a competitive advantage over interstate goods, which was deemed to be a
regulation of interstate and foreign commerce in violation of the commerce clause) (consolidated
cases). The United States Supreme Court has heard Sears, Roebuck on appeal. 48 U.S.L.W. 3459
(January 22, 1980). The case has been restored to the calendar for reargument. 48 U.S.L.W. 3698
(April 29, 1980).
79. See, e.g., Clark, Property Taxation of Foreign Goods & Enterprises-A Study in Inconsistency, 4 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 39, 79 (1976); Comment, State Taxation ofInternationalAir Carriers.
57 Nw. U. L. REv. 92, 103 (1962). See also Sea-Land Serv., 117 Cal.2d 447, 528 P.2d 56, 67
(1974). But see Miller, Foreign Commerce and State Power: The Constitutionality of State Buy
American Statutes, 12 CORNELL INT'L. L.J. 109 (1979) ("a proposal to revitalize the foreign commerce clause"); Comment, Limitations On State Taxation of Foreign Commerce: The Contemporary
Vitality of the Home-Port Doctrine, 127 U. PENN. L. REV. 817 (1979) (although "anachronistic,"
the home port doctrine is "most prudent"); Note, Alternative Theories for Establishing a Federal
Common Law of ForeignJudgments in Commerical Cases: The Foreign Affairs Power and the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, 16 VA. J. INT'L. L. 635,658 (1976).
80. See Section III infra.
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and not this Court, that the Constitution has committed such policy decisions." 81 Other commentators share this position. 82 Nevertheless, in Japan Line the Court dictated United States international tax policy.
IV.

ALTERNATIVES

The possibility of entering into an international tax treaty offers one
solution to the problem of double taxation. 83 The United States is party to
several international agreements affecting instrumentalities of commerce. 84 Containers could be exempted from ad valorem property taxation by such a convention or treaty. 85 One obstacle to such an interna-"
tional agreement is Congress' understandable reluctance to interfere with

81. In Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267,280 (1978), the Court explained:
While the freedom of the States to formulate independent policy in this area may have to yield to
an overriding national interest in uniformity, the content of any uniform rules to which they must
subscribe should be determined only after due consideration is given to the interests of all affected States. It is clear that the legislative power granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause
of the Constitution would amply justify the enactment of legislation requiring all States to adhere
to uniform rules for the division of income. It is to that body and not this Court, that the Constitution has committed such policy decisions.
82. The Court has attempted to construct a consistent national program of international taxation
on a case by case basis. It should have left tax policy to be developed by experts in national and
international taxation. See Hellerstein, State Taxation Under the Commerce Clause: An Historical
Perspective, 29 VAND. L. REV. 335, 350-51 (1976); Note, State Taxation of ForeignAircraft Used
In Foreign Commerce, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 968, 973-74 (1961).
83. See, e.g., Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 454-55; ScandinavianAirlines Sys., 56 Cal. 2d 11, 14
Cal. Rptr. at 48, 363 P.2d at 48 (Traynor, J. dissenting); Note, State Taxation of Foreign Aircraft
Use in Foreign Commerce, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 968, 974 (1961); Comment, State Taxation ofInternationalAir Transport, 11 STAN. L. REV. 518, 536-37 (1959). Even after Japan Line, assuming that
the United States could negotiate a tax treaty (see text following note 75 supra) a tax treaty could
prevent foreign nations from taxing in a way that our nation is no longer constitutionally able to do.
84. E.g., Customs Convention of Containers, May 18, 1956, [1969] 20 U.S.T. 301, T.I.A.S.
No. 6634, 338 U.N.T.S. 103; Interim Agreement on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 59
Stat. 1516, E.A.S. No. 469, 15 U.N.T.S. 205 (International Civil Aviation Organization Council
Resolution III, November 1966). See Comment, Limitations on State Taxation of Foreign Commerce: The Contemporary Vitality of the Home-Port Doctrine, 127 U. PENN. L. REv. 817, 835
(1979). For a list of the numerous bilateral and multilateral conventions to which Japan adheres, see
A. EHRENswEIG, S. IKEHARA, N. JENSEN, BILATERAL STUDIES IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW-No.
12: AMERICAN-JAPANESE PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 24, 137-46 (1964).
85. For example, the OECD model double taxation convention of income and on capital suggests
a simple rule based on a single taxing authority. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPIrrAL (1977). In Chapter IV-Taxation of Capital, Article 22-Capital, the OECD recommends:
Capital represented by ships and aircraft operated in international traffic and by boats engaged in
inland waterways transport, any by movable property pertaining to the operation of such ships,
aircraft and boats, shall be taxable only in the Contracting State in which the place of effective
management of the enterprise is situated.
Id. at 38. See also Commentary on Article 22; id. at 143.
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state taxing power. 86 As a result of the Court's decision, however, the
87
odds of successfully negotiating such a treaty are diminished.
A more realistic alternative is congressional regulation. If, before Japan Line, Congress had decided that a state tax upon instrumentalities of
international commerce unduly interfered with the nation's foreign relations, it could have exercised its commerce power, precluding such taxation by statute. At the same time Congress might have found alternative
means of recompensing states that provide services to international containers. The result in Japan Line, however, constitutionally restricts the
states' legitimate taxing power and is thus less flexible and retractable
than congressional preemption. The result should serve as an invitation to
88
Congress to consider whether overriding legislation is possible.
V.

CONCLUSION

By deferring largely to the interests of foreign taxing authorities, the
Court has severely impaired the states' ability to obtain compensation for
services they provide. Its rule of constitutional construction rejects a rea86. The Senate approved a version of the United States-United Kingdom income tax treaty on
June 27, 1978. In that version the Senate reserved as to Article 9(4), which prohibited any state from
using the unitary apportionment system to determine its share of taxable income of U.K. enterprises
and subsidiaries. Under the unitary concept a state seeks a portion of a multi-state or multi-national
company's consolidated income on the basis of a predetermined formula. The California formula
requires foreign-owned corporations to provide sales and wage information about all their worldwide
operations, not merely those in California. The U.K., the Netherlands, Canada, and Japan complained about the unusually broad disclosure required by the state of California. Nonetheless, the
final version of the treaty, approved by the Senate on July 9, 1979, contains no prohibition on the use
of the unitary apportionment system. Articles of ratification were exchanged on March 25, 1980. and
the treaty entered into force on April 25, 1980. [1980] TAx TREATIES II (P-H) 89,001. See Burge,
The United States-United Kingdom Income Tax Treaty, in INCOME TAX TREATiES 683, 700-01 (J.
Bischel ed. 1978).
87. See text following note 75 supra.
88.

See Kaplan, United States: Taxing Foreign Firms by Formula, TAX MANAGEMENT INT'L. J..

(September 1979), at 3: "[I]t is possible that Congress will accede to pressure from the states to
reverse the holding of the Japan Line case by federal statute." Id. at 19. Congress might be able to
find a way to compensate the states for the services they provide to instrumentalities in international
commerce, for example through revenue sharing. See Note, State Taxation of Foreign Commerce, 45
J. Am L. & COMMERCE 559, 573 (1980). Alternatively, Congress may be able to override a constitutional holding by the Supreme Court. Congress has twice previously enacted legislation indicating
that interstate commerce may be subject to certain state regulation though the Supreme Court had
invalidated it under the commerce clause. See, e.g., the Wilson Act, 26 Stat. 313 (1890), enabling
states to prohibit sale in the original package of liquor brought from other states. The Supreme Court
had previously struck down such legislation in Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 109-10 (1890). The
Court sustained the constitutionality of the Wilson Act in In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891). Congress similarly overrode the Court's restriction of states' power in Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestem Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465 (1888). The Webb-Kenyon Act, 37 Stat. 699-700 (1913), allowed a state
to prohibit the importation of liquor. Bikle, The Silence of Congress,41 HAtv. L. REv. 200, 203-07
(1927). Congress would be best informed as to what precise alternative solutions are available.
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sonably apportioned nondiscriminatory tax in favor of maintaining symmetry in the current international tax structure which may be transitory at
best. 89 Abruptly the Court has abandoned its own constitutional rules developed over many years. Its judgment on national tax policy is essentially a legislative one, not compelled by any constitutional principle recognized in the past. Congress should intervene to develop rules under
which instrumentalities in foreign commerce, as in interstate commerce,
may properly be subjected to nondiscriminatory state taxes, assessed on a
reasonably apportioned basis.

Laura Treadgold Oles

89. E.g., the West German taxing system would change automatically if another nation began to
tax instrumentalities of international commerce. JapanLine, 441 U.S. at 453 n. 18. See Clark, Property Taxation of Foreign Goods and Enterprises-A Study In Inconsistency, 4 PEPPERDINE L. REv.
39, 79 (1976). Thp Court in JapanLine stressed that the California tax created multiple taxation in
fact. JapanLine, 441 U.S. at 452.
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